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CONSENSUS THEORIES. AN ORIENTED SURVEY 
 
 
 
Olivier HUDRY1, Bernard MONJARDET2 
 
 
Théories du consensus. Une synthèse orientée 
RÉSUMÉ – Cet article présente une vue d’ensemble de sept directions de recherche en 
théorie du consensus : résultats arrowiens, règles d’agrégation définies au moyen de 
fédérations, règles définies au moyen de distances, solutions de tournoi, domaines restreints, 
théories abstraites du consensus, questions de complexité et d’algorithmique. Ce panorama est 
orienté dans la mesure où il présente principalement – mais non exclusivement – les travaux 
les plus significatifs obtenus – quelquefois avec d’autres chercheurs – par une équipe de 
chercheurs français qui sont – ou ont été – membres pléniers ou associés du Centre d’analyse 
et de mathématique sociale (CAMS). 
 
MOTS-CLÉS – théories du consensus, résultats arrowiens, règles d’agrégation, distances, 
médiane, solutions de tournoi, domaines restreints, valuations inférieures, demi-treillis à 
médianes, complexité. 
 
 
SUMMARY – This article surveys seven directions of consensus theories: Arrowian results, 
federation consensus rules, metric consensus rules, tournament solutions, restricted domains, 
abstract consensus theories, algorithmic and complexity issues. This survey is oriented in the 
sense that it is mainly – but not exclusively – concentrated on the most significant results 
obtained, sometimes with other searchers, by a team of French searchers who are or were full 
or associate members of the Centre d’analyse et de mathématique sociale (CAMS). 
 
KEYWORDS – consensus theories, Arrowian results, aggregation rules, metric consensus 
rules, median, tournament solutions, restricted domains, lower valuations, median semilattice, 
complexity. 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Let us specify the contents of this paper. By consensus theory, we mean any theory dealing 
with a problem where several “objects” must be merged into one (or several) “consensus 
object(s)” of the same or of similar nature that in some sense represent(s) them at best. This 
                                                
1 Télécom ParisTech, 46, rue Barrault, 75634 Paris Cedex 13, hudry@enst.fr. O. Hudry’s research was 
supported by the ANR project “Computational Social Choice” n° ANR-09-BLAN-0305-03. 
2 Centre d’Économie de la Sorbonne, Université Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne, Maison des Sciences Économiques, 
106-112, boulevard de l’Hôpital, 75647 Paris Cedex 13, and CAMS, EHESS, Bernard.Monjardet@univ-paris1.fr 
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type of problem appears first with the problem of means in statistics. Here the objects are 
numbers (the elements of a statistical series) and the aim is to find a number summarizing this 
series as well as possible (classical answers are the arithmetical mean, the median or the 
mode). In social choice theory and multiple criteria decision aid, the objects can be 
preferences expressed by voters or through criteria. These preferences can be modelled by  
– crisp or fuzzy – binary relations like – crisp or fuzzy – orders (of various kinds); they can 
also be represented by utility functions. One can also consider the case where voters’ 
preferences are expressed via choice functions. In cluster analysis, the objects to aggregate 
can be classifications, like partitions (or, equivalently, equivalence relations) or hierarchies 
(also called n-trees). They can also be functions like ultrametrics. In biomathematics, the 
objects can be unrooted trees or molecular sequences. In computer science, they can be 
rankings given by Web search engines. Merging symbolic objects is a topic of artificial 
intelligence. There is a large amount of practices and literature in sport to aggregate the scores 
given by judges (or obtained on several criteria) on the performances of the athletes. Finally, 
the recently largely developed topic of “judgment aggregation” appears at least as soon as 
1785 with Condorcet’s Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions 
rendues à la pluralité des voix [1785].  
This survey deals with seven main directions in consensus theories that will be 
examined in the following sections. 
1. Arrowian results. Arrow’s theorem [1951] shows that imposing some a priori desirable 
properties to an aggregation function may lead to a very unsatisfactory rule, namely a 
“dictatorship”, in which the consensus object is the object provided by the “dictator”3. In fact, 
if we add, as a condition for the rule, that it must not be dictatorial or – more generally – 
“oligarchic”, one often gets impossibility results. Since then, many other impossibility results 
have been obtained from this “axiomatic” approach. 
2. Federation consensus rules. These rules are the generalization of the classical majority rule 
promoted by Condorcet. In the majority rule applied to the preferences of voters, an 
alternative x is collectively preferred to another alternative y if a majority of voters prefers x 
to y. Now, this rule is extended by replacing the family of usual majorities by a family (called 
federation) of generalized majorities. For instance, we can take the family of all the subsets of 
voters with a size greater than or equal to a given integer q, obtaining thus the so-called quota 
rules. But like the majority rule, these federation rules can lead to unsatisfactory consensus 
objects. Recall that the majority rule applied to preferences can lead to an “effet Condorcet” 
(see Example 1 in Section V), i.e. to cycles a > b > c > a in the collective preference, where 
x > y means that x is preferred to y by a majority (here, the relation > is not assumed to be 
transitive).  
3. Metric consensus rules. If one reckons that a consensus rule does not need to satisfy all 
Arrow’s axioms and especially the independence axiom, many rules are available and in 
particular the metric rules. To define such a rule, the set of objects is made a metric space by 
introducing a notion of distance between (any) two objects. Then, based on this distance, we 
define a remoteness function between an n-tuple of these objects and any object. The 
consensus objects of an n-tuple are those minimizing this remoteness. Section IV develops 
particularly the most known metric rule, namely the so-called median procedure.  
4. Tournament solutions. A tournament is a binary relation T such that, for any distinct 
elements x and y, we have one and only one of the following two possibilities: x is preferred 
to y according to T (xTy) or y is preferred to x according to T (yTx). A transitive tournament is 
                                                
3 In fact, such a dictator is called an absolute dictator and it is obtained when the preferences are linear orders. In 
Arrow’s theorem on complete preorders, the dictator imposes only his strict preference (and not his indifference) 
between two alternatives.  
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a (strict) linear order and conversely. Such a structure can be used to summarize the result of a 
pairwise comparison method when there is no tie. Such a tournament may be transitive; it is 
then a linear order and it is natural to consider that the first element of the linear order is the 
winner of the pairwise comparison method. It is more difficult and thus more disputable to 
determine a winner when the tournament is not transitive. The aim of tournament solutions is 
to determine a winner from a tournament, sometimes to rank all the elements to which the 
pairwise comparison method is applied.  
5. Restricted domains. Another classical way to escape impossibility Arrowian theorems is to 
restrict the domain of objects to aggregate. In particular, there is a big amount of literature on 
this topic in social choice theory and we will present results related to the case where 
preferences are modelled by linear orders.  
6. Abstract consensus theories. It was observed that very similar consensus results appear in 
different fields. For instance, there are “oligarchic” results in the aggregation of orders, choice 
functions or partitions. This fostered the researchers to find aggregation results on more 
“abstract” objects in order to generalize and unify those obtained in particular domains.  
7. Complexity issues. From a practical point of view, the algorithmic complexity of a method 
plays an essential role; for instance for an election, it is quite important to be able to declare 
who is the winner in a “reasonable” time. In this respect, polynomial methods are usually 
preferable to exponential methods. Indeed for an exponential method the CPU time may 
quickly become prohibitive if we want to compute an exact solution. Now when a problem is 
NP-hard (or NP-complete if we deal with a decision problem, i.e. a problem in which a 
question is set with “yes” or “no” as its answer), the only methods known nowadays to solve 
the problem exactly are exponential. It is thus quite important to know whether the considered 
problem is polynomial or NP-hard. 
 
On the other hand, this survey is oriented since we will mainly – but not exclusively – 
survey the most significant contributions of a team of researchers4 who are or were full or 
associate members of the “Centre d’analyse et de mathématique sociale” (CAMS) at the 
“École des hautes études en sciences sociales” (EHESS)5. These contributions are contained 
in some of the about one hundred papers written by them (often in cooperation with other – 
French or not – searchers) on consensus problems6. These papers were published from 1952 
and the first ones were generally written in French, which can explain that they remained 
rather unknown7. Moreover, since this paper will be published in a special issue of 
Mathématiques et Sciences humaines in Bruno Leclerc’s honour, we will particularly develop 
his contributions. A much more exhaustive survey on a large part of the literature on 
consensus theories up to 2003 can be found in Day and McMorris’s excellent book Axiomatic 
Consensus Theory in Group Choice and Biomathematics [2003]. An older survey for the 
consensus of classifications is [Leclerc, 1998]. A recent survey on the main aspects of the 
                                                
4 Barbut, Barbut-Le Conte de Poly, Barthélemy, Bermond, Chameni-Nembua, Domenach, Guilbaud, Feldman-
Högaasen, Hudry, Leclerc, Monjardet, Raderanirina, Rosenstiehl.  
5 Obviously, this survey is still less a survey on the contributions of French searchers on consensus theories. 
Since Borda and Condorcet, there are many of them: without attempting to be exhaustive, let us mention Caen’s 
team in social choice theory around Maurice Salles (Lepelley, Mbih, Merlin, Vidu…) and people like Bloch, 
Bordes, Bouyssou, Demange, Dubois, Grabisch, Kolm, Laslier, Laffond, Lainé, Lang, Lebreton, Mongin, 
Moulin, Perny, Prade, Roy, Tallon, Trannoy... For details on the CAMS, see [Monjardet, 2005]. 
6 The list of these papers up to 2003 can be found in [Monjardet 2005]. 
7 It is stranger for some other papers written in English, published in reputed international journals and 
containing significant results.  
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median procedure is [Hudry, Leclerc, Monjardet and Barthélemy, 2009], whereas related 
surveys on the linear ordering problem are [Charon and Hudry, 2007a and 2010]. Finally, a 
survey on the complexity of voting procedures is [Hudry, 2009a]. 
 
Remark. Unless stated otherwise, all the mathematical objects considered in this paper are 
finite.  
 
 
II. ARROWIAN RESULTS 
  
 The “axiomatic” approach initiated by Arrow for complete preorders8 was used for 
many other objects. As soon as 1952, Guilbaud [1952] uses it for judgment aggregation (see 
Section VII). Brown [1975] uses it for orders and Mirkin [1975] for partitions. Barthélemy 
[1982] uses it when the domain and the codomain of the aggregation function are sets of 
orders. He assumes that the domain is sufficiently large, in the sense that, for any triple of 
alternatives, it contains all the possible orders (except maybe the trivial one). Then he shows 
that when this domain is included in the codomain, the only aggregation functions satisfying 
the independence condition9 and the weak Pareto principle10 are the absolute dictatorships or 
the absolute oligarchies11.  
We said above that the preferences of an individual can also be expressed by a choice 
function. The aggregation of choice functions was first studied by the Russian school 
(Aizerman, Aleskerov, Malishevsky…; see for instance [Aleskerov, 1999]). Monjardet and 
Raderanirina [2004] study the latticial structure of some significant classes of choice 
functions. Then, using the latticial approach presented below in Section VII, they obtain 
axiomatic results on the aggregation of choice functions in these classes.  
In cluster analysis, Mirkin [1975] was the first to use the axiomatic method for the 
case of partitions and to obtain an oligarchic result. His result was improved by Leclerc 
[1984] as a by-product of his significant theorem on the consensus of valued preorders. A 
valued preorder (or valued quasi-order) on a set X is a map p: X2 → R+ satisfying, for all 
(x, y, z) ∈ X3, p(x, z) ≤ max(p(x, y), p(y, z)) and, for every x ∈ X, p(x, x) = 0. So, the valued 
preorders are – under duality – identical to the fuzzy preorders satisfying maxmin transitivity 
[Zadeh, 1971]. On the other hand, a symmetric valued preorder, i.e. satisfying p(x, y) = p(y, 
x), is an ultrametric distance12. The set V of all valued preorders is ordered by the pointwise 
order on functions and closed with respect to the usual join operation: 
                                                
8 A complete preorder R (called ordering by Arrow and also called weak order, weak ordering, complete pre-
ordering, complete quasi-ordering, linear preorder, ranking, etc.) is a complete (we must have xRy or yRx) and 
transitive (xRy and yRz imply xRz) binary relation. An antisymmetric (xRy and yRx imply x = y ) complete 
preorder is a linear order. An order is a reflexive (xRx), antisymmetric and transitive binary relation; so, an order 
is a linear order if and only if it is complete. 
9 The independence condition says that if the preferences restricted to two alternatives of two profiles are the 
same, then the collective preference for these profiles on these alternatives must be the same. This condition 
(with some variants) can be stated for any consensus function.  
10 The weak Pareto principle says that the aggregation function must preserve the unanimous preferences of the 
voters.  
11 In an absolute oligarchic rule, the consensus object is completely determined only by some voters. For 
instance, when the objects are orders, the consensus object is the intersection of the orders given by these voters 
(i.e. their unanimous preferences). 
12 Ultrametrics are significant in cluster analysis since they induce a chain of nested (and indexed) partitions.  
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p∨p′(x, y) = max(p(x, y), p′(x, y)). Leclerc defines two “Arrow-like” axioms for the 
aggregation of valued preorders. Let F be a map Vn → V and let p (respectively, p′) denote 
the image F(Π) (respectively, F(Π′)) of a profile Π = (p1, …, pn) (respectively, Π′) of valued 
preorders; these axioms are: 
Efficiency: for every profile Π ∈ Vn and all (x, y) ∈ X2, 
max p(x, y) ≤ maxi∈{1, 2, …, n} pi(x, y). 
Binariness: for all the profiles (Π, Π′) ∈ (Vn)2 and (x, y) ∈ X2, 
pi(x, y) = p′i(x, y) for i ∈ {1, 2, …, n} implies p(x, y) = p′(x, y). 
We may observe that these axioms are generalizations of classical Paretian and independence 
axioms. Then, Leclerc obtains the following result (where º is the composition operation of two maps): 
 
THEOREM 1. 
A consensus function F: Vn → V satisfies the efficiency and binariness properties if and only 
if there exist n reductive and isotone13 maps f1,…, fn from R+ into itself such that 
F(Π) = (f1ºp1)∨(f2ºp2) ∨…∨(fnºpn). 
 
Replacing R+ by the set {0, 1} ordered by <, Leclerc shows that the following results 
are particular cases of Theorem 1: Mas-Collel and Sonnenschein’s result [1972] on complete 
preorders14, Brown’s result [1975] on orders, Mirkin’s result [1981] on preorders. Moreover 
he obtains a form of Arrow’s 1951 theorem. Other particular cases deal with cluster analysis 
where Leclerc obtains – as already noticed – an improvement of Mirkin’s 1975 theorem on 
partitions15 and a result on the consensus of ultrametrics. On the other hand, the above result 
is considerably extended in [Leclerc, 1991]. Here, valued preorders are replaced by much 
more general valued objects16 defined by maps from a lattice of objects into a lattice of 
values. The set of these valued objects is itself a lattice (isomorphic to a lattice of Galois 
maps17) and so, one can apply, and above all particularize to this case, the results of the 
latticial consensus theory described in Section VII. Then, consensus functions called 
extensively oligarchic (dual generalizations of the above map F) are characterized.  
For the case of hierarchies18 in cluster analysis, variants of Arrow’s independence 
axiom lead to characterizations of dictatorship and absolute dictatorships consensus rules 
[Barthélemy and McMorris, 1989], [Barthélemy, McMorris and Powers, 1991, 1992]. 
The above Arrowian results are often “negative” since, by adding as a condition for 
the rule that it must not have a dictatorial or oligarchic form, we often obtain impossibility 
results. The Arrowian approach leads to more positive results when it comes to axiomatic 
characterizations of interesting consensus rules, a line of research initiated by May as soon as 
                                                
13 A map f from R+ into R+ is reductive if f(x) ≤ x and isotone if x ≤ y implies f(x) ≤ f(y). 
14 Mas-Collel and Sonnenschein’s result deals with the aggregation of complete preorders into the so-called 
quasi-transitive relations, i.e. the complete relations for which the asymmetric part is an order.  
15 This improved form was found again by [Fishburn and Rubinstein, 1986]; see [Barthélemy 1988a].  
16 They could as well be called fuzzy objects, but in the paper they are rather strangely called valued preferences. 
17 A Galois map between two lattices is a map f such that f(x∨y) = f(x∧y) and f(0) = 1. 
18 A hierarchy – also called n-tree – on a set E is a family H of subsets (called classes or clusters) of E such that 
if two classes have a nonempty intersection, then one of these classes is contained in the other. One also assumes 
that E and all the singletons are classes and that the empty set is not a class.  
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1952 for the majority rule [May, 1952]. Several such results will be presented in the following 
sections.  
 
 
III. FEDERATION CONSENSUS RULES 
 
A federation (also called simple game19) F on a set N is a family F of subsets of N (called 
coalitions) closed under supersets: 
∀ S ⊆ N and ∀ U ⊆ N, [S ∈ F and S ⊆ U] ⇒ [U ∈ F].  
Federations allow defining consensus rules for many objects. For instance, let N = {1, 2, ..., n} 
be a set of n voters choosing their preference relations in a set of relations defined on a set A 
and let Π = (R1, R2, ..., Rn) be a profile of relations. For (x, y) ∈ A2, we set: 
NΠ(x, y) = {i ∈ N: xRiy} and nΠ(x, y) = |NΠ(x, y)|. 
Then, the collective preference relation RF (Π) associated with the federation F and the profile 
Π is given by:  
∀ (x, y) ∈  A2, [xRF(Π)y] ⇔ [NΠ(x, y) ∈ F]. 
So, we take as the consensus relation the ordered pairs unanimously present in at least a 
coalition, what can also be written: 
RF (Π) = ∪S∈F {∩{Ri, i ∈ S}}  
(a formulation that will be generalized in Section VII). 
 The usual majority rule is obtained by considering the federation formed by all the 
majority coalitions, i.e. the coalitions of size greater than n/2. More generally, the so-called 
quota rules are defined by an integer q and the federation  
Fq = {S ⊆ N: |S| ≥ q}. 
By increasing the quota q, we put in the consensus relation ordered pairs more and more 
frequent in the relations of the profile. In the extreme case where q = n, we obtain the Pareto 
(or unanimity) rule where the consensus relation keeps only the unanimous ordered pairs.  
We find again the oligarchic rules of the previous section (see footnote 11) by taking a 
filter, i.e. the set of supersets of a fixed set M ⊆ N, as the federation. If the set M is reduced to 
a singleton {i}, i.e. if the filter is an ultrafilter, we obtain an (absolute) dictatorship, since the 
consensus relation is Ri.  
Guilbaud [1952] was the first to use federations (called families of generalized 
majorities by him). He stated an Arrowian theorem for judgment aggregation (see 
Section VII) by essentially proving that Arrowian conditions required for a federation 
consensus rule imply that the federation is an ultrafilter20. 
In [Monjardet, 1978], federation21 rules are used for tournaments. The problem of 
aggregating tournaments occurs for instance with the paired comparison method in socio-
psychology. When a subject is asked to give all his binary preferences between some objects, 
the result can contain intransitivities, as a > b > c > a. So, when the subject must express 
strict preferences (indifference and abstention are excluded), the result is a tournament. In 
[Monjardet, 1978], several axiomatically-defined aggregation rules on tournaments are 
                                                
19 This last appellation is due to von Neumann and Morgenstern who use this structure in their theory of games. 
It is unfortunate that it went on again in the different context of social choice theory. The better term of 
federation is due to Mirkin [1981]. 
20 For the use of ultrafilters in social choice theory, see [Monjardet, 1983]. 
21 Here a federation is called a family of majorities and it satisfies an additional condition: a coalition belongs to 
the family F if and only if the complementary coalition does not belong to F. 
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characterized as rules defined by federations. As a by-product, one obtains a Galois 
connexion22 showing the duality between Arrow’s theorem and Ward’s theorem23 for linear 
orders. 
The general problem with the federation consensus rules is that the consensus object 
may be unsatisfactory. First, it may not belong to the class of considered objects (for instance, 
the majority rule on linear orders may produce a non-transitive tournament). But, even if it is 
not the case, the consensus object may remain unsatisfying. For instance, in cluster analysis, 
the unanimity rule applied to hierarchies is often called the strict rule. This rule, like more 
generally other quota rules, gives a hierarchy but which may miss some structural features of 
the aggregated hierarchies and, in particular, the fact that two elements of the set E of 
elements to classify may be put together in all the hierarchies before to be joined by a third 
element. Then, one would wish that these two elements appear in some cluster of the 
consensus hierarchy not containing the third element. The celebrated Adams’s rule [Adams, 
1986] achieves this wish. First, Adams associates a nesting relation on the subsets of E with 
any hierarchy and conversely. Then, given a profile of hierarchies, the consensus hierarchy is 
this one corresponding with the intersection of all the nesting relations associated with the 
hierarchies of the profile. The one-to-one correspondence between hierarchies and nesting 
relations has been generalized to a one-to-one correspondence between Moore families24 and 
overhanging relations by Domenach and Leclerc [2004a, 2004b, 2007]. The problem to 
aggregate Moore families occurs in several fields and raises the same type of difficulties as 
the above problem for hierarchies. Then, Adams’s method can be generalized by using quota 
rules on the overhanging relations associated with a profile of Moore families. But the 
obtained relation is not necessarily an overhanging relation. Nevertheless, one can show that 
there exists at most a unique overhanging relation containing this relation and satisfying 
another desirable condition [Leclerc, 2004], [Domenach and Leclerc 2004b]. Now, when this 
overhanging relation exists, one can come back to a Moore family. If one applies this method 
to aggregate Moore families of a special class, one still needs to obtain a Moore family of the 
same type. It is shown in [Domenach, 2010] that it is indeed the case for some classes of 
Moore families. 
 
 
IV. METRIC CONSENSUS RULES 
 
The most known metric rule is the so-called Kemeny rule defined for complete preorders in 
[Kemeny, 1959]. Kemeny defines a measure of distance between two complete preorders as 
the number of their disagreements25. This measure is actually a distance since it is nothing 
else than the well-known symmetric difference distance. Then, Kemeny defines the 
                                                
22 For all terms of order or lattice theories not defined here, see for instance [Davey and Priestley, 2001] and 
[Caspard, Leclerc and Monjardet, 2007]. 
23 A cyclic triple of preferences on three objects a, b, c is a triple such as: a > b > c, b > c > a and c > a > b. 
Ward’s theorem says that majority rule applied on linear orders belonging to a set of linear orders always 
provides an order if and only if this set does not contain cyclic triples.  
24 A Moore family (also called a closure system) on a set N is a family F of subsets of N (the closed sets) closed 
by intersection and containing the set N. By adding the empty set to a hierarchy, this one becomes a closure 
system. 
25 Two complete preorders have two (respectively one) disagreement(s) for the pair {x, y} if one prefers x to y 
and the other y to x (respectively, is indifferent between x and y). In the case of linear orders where the number 
of disagreements can only be equal to 0 or 2 for each pair, half this distance normalized between –1 and +1 is 
Kendall’s tau, well-known to the statisticians [Kendall, 1938]. 
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remoteness between a profile of complete preorders and a complete preorder as the sum of the 
distances between this complete preorder and those in the profile. Finally, he defines the 
consensus complete preorders of a profile as the complete preorders minimizing the 
remoteness to this profile. His paper contains also an axiomatic characterization of the 
symmetric difference distance between complete preorders. Barthélemy [1979, see also 1981] 
improves it in a paper containing characterizations of this same distance for the most used sets 
of relations and where he also shows the independence of the considered axioms.  
Any set of binary relations (and, more generally of sets) endowed with the symmetric 
difference distance becomes a metric space. In a metric space, a “point” minimizing the sum 
of its distances to an n-tuple of other points is classically called a (metric) median of these 
points. Then, Kemeny’s rule is a particular case of what has be called the median procedure26 
to define consensus objects. In the case of arbitrary binary relations, this procedure has been 
independently proposed by Barbut [1967] and Mirkin [1974]. Both authors observe that the 
majority (or Condorcet) relation of a profile of (arbitrary) relations is a median of this profile. 
But, this procedure is a “multiprocedure” in the sense that a profile has generally several 
medians. And generally the computation of median objects amounts to solve difficult 
combinatorial optimisation problems (see Section VIII).  
Consider first the case where the objects are linear orders. In this case, one can 
observe that the median procedure can be defined in many other ways (sixteen are presented 
in [Monjardet, 1990b]). For instance, in statistics, a classic concordance coefficient between 
the linear orders of a profile is the so-called Kendall-Ehrenberg’s coefficient U. This 
coefficient is formed by the mean of Kendall’s tau on the pairs of linear orders of the profile. 
But since Kendall’s tau is a normalization of the symmetric difference distance between linear 
orders, computing a median order of a profile Π of linear orders is equivalent to computing a 
linear order L maximizing the coefficient U(Π + L) 27. Several of the many ways to define 
median linear orders have been independently proposed in the literature. In particular, 
arguments advanced by Guilbaud [1952] and Young [1988] lead to think that it was the rule 
proposed by Condorcet to palliate the “Condorcet effect” (the possible existence of cycles in 
the majority relation)28, see [Monjardet, 2005 or 2008] for details. A remarkable result is the 
axiomatic characterization of the median rule for linear orders by Young and Levenglick 
[1978] who use in particular a consistency axiom29 that we will find again several times. The 
median procedure also appeared in cluster analysis. It has been first used for partitions by 
Régnier [1965], then independently by Mirkin [1974]. The problems related to the 
computation of median relations will be examined in Section VIII. 
The median procedure has been also used for hierarchies by Margush and McMorris 
[1981]. The case of hierarchies is particular since the set of all hierarchies (on a set) is 
endowed with a median semilattice structure (see Section VII). Then, median hierarchies can 
be easily obtained from the majority hierarchy [Barthélemy and McMorris, 1986]. In this 
same paper, the characterization of the median procedure for hierarchies, by the consistency 
axiom (see footnote 29) and four other axioms, is a particular case of the characterization of 
                                                
26 For a survey on the median procedure up to 1988, see [Barthélemy and Monjardet, 1981 and 1988]. For 
historical details on the median in several (discrete or not) metric spaces, see [Monjardet, 1991 and 2008]. 
27 For an alike use of the Borda-Kendall coefficient, see [Monjardet, 1985 and 1997]. 
28 When there is no Condorcet effect, all the median linear orders are the linear orders containing the order given 
by the majority rule (if the number of voters is odd, there is a unique median). 
29 This consistency axiom says that if two profiles of linear orders have some identical median linear orders, then 
the profile formed by the concatenation of these two profiles must have these identical linear orders as its median 
linear orders. 
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medians in a median semilattice presented in Section VII. A class belongs (respectively, does 
not belong, or may or not belong) to a median hierarchy of an n-tuple of hierarchies if it 
occurs in at least n/2 (respectively less than n/2, or equal to n/2) classes of the n-tuple. More 
generally, Barthélemy [1988b] defines a thresholded consensus rule by considering an 
interval [m, m′] of numbers and by setting that a class belonging to k hierarchies of a profile 
of hierarchies belongs (respectively, does not belong, or may or not belong) to a consensus 
hierarchy of this profile if k ≥ m′ (respectively k < m, or m ≤ k < m′). Then, he characterizes 
these thresholded rules.  
 
 
V. TOURNAMENT SOLUTIONS 
 
This section is devoted to the so-called tournament solutions (see [Laslier, 1993, 1996, 1997] 
and [Moulin, 1986]) of which the aim is to determine a winner from a tournament. Remember 
that a tournament is a binary relation T such that, for any distinct elements x and y, we have 
one and only one of the following two possibilities: xTy or yTx (see Figure 1). Note that a 
transitive tournament is a (strict) linear order and conversely. The procedures described here 
(for other tournament solutions, see for instance [Laslier, 1996, 1997]) rather apply to 
unweighted tournaments, but the first two can be extended to weighted tournaments (see 
Section V.3).  
A tournament can be used to summarize the result of a pairwise comparison method 
when there is no tie, as assumed in the sequel. For instance, if such a method is applied in an 
election, then we obtain the majority tournament T = (X, A) of the election: the set X of 
vertices is the set of the candidates of the election; in the following, n will denote the size of 
X; there is a directed edge from x to y in A if x is preferred to y by a majority of voters. 
Example 1 below illustrates these considerations. 
 
Example 1. Assume that nine voters must rank n = 4 candidates a, b, c, and d. The preferences 
of the voters are supposed to be given by the following linear orders (where x > y still means 
that x is preferred to y by a majority of voters, as above, but here the relation > is assumed to 
be transitive: x > y and y > z involve x > z): 
• the preferences of three voters are: a > b > c > d; 
• the preferences of two voters are: b > d > c > a; 
• the preference of one voter is: d > c > a > b; 
• the preference of one voter is: a > c > b > d; 
• the preference of one voter is: d > b > a > c; 
• the preference of one voter is: c > d > b > a. 
Here, the majority relation is not a linear order, but the tournament of Figure 1. 
 
 a b 
c d 
 
Figure 1. The majority tournament associated with the data of Example 1. 
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We shall note that, if the election summarized by T admits a Condorcet winner C, i.e. 
a candidate preferred to any other candidate by a majority of voters, the tournament solutions 
described below will select C as the unique winner. 
 
 
V.1. NUMBER OF WINS: COPELAND’S SOLUTION 
 
The procedure designed by A.H. Copeland30 [1951] is based on the Copeland scores. The 
Copeland score s(x) of a candidate x is the number of candidates defeated by x. From the 
graph theoretic point of view, s(x) is the outdegree of x. A Copeland winner is any candidate 
with a maximum Copeland score (we may also rank the candidates according to the non-
increasing Copeland scores). 
 Its application to Example 1 gives: s(a) = 2, s(b) = 2, s(c) = 1, s(d) = 1. Here, a and b 
are the Copeland winners.  
 
 
V.2. LINEAR ORDERS AT MINIMUM DISTANCE: SLATER’S SOLUTION 
 
Slater solution [1961] allows also ranking the candidates. It consists in reversing a minimum 
number of arcs of T in order to obtain a transitive tournament O, i.e. a linear order, and then to 
consider the winner of O as a Slater winner. More precisely, let O be a linear order defined on 
X. We define the distance θ(T, O) between T and O as the number of arcs of T which have a 
different orientation in O (note that this distance is half the symmetric difference distance of 
Section IV applied to the relations T and O). A Slater order of T is a linear order O* 
minimizing θ(T, O) over the set of the linear orders O defined on X. A Slater winner of T is 
the winner of any Slater order of T. We note i(T) the minimum number of arcs that must be 
reversed in T to get a Slater order O* of T: θ(T, O*) = i(T); i(T) is called the Slater index of T. 
 It is easy to see that the Slater index of the tournament of Figure 1 is equal to 1: 
reversing (d, a) is sufficient to obtain a linear order, namely a > b > c > d. In fact, we may 
prove that this reversing is also necessary to obtain a linear order: thus a > b > c > d is the 
only Slater order of this tournament and a is its only Slater winner. 
 Attention had been paid to combinatorial aspects of Slater’s solution. For instance, the 
maximum values that the Slater index can take, the number of Slater orders that a given 
tournament can admit, some links between Slater orders and Hamiltonian paths, or the 
construction of tournaments with a given Slater index are investigated in papers like 
[Barthélemy et al., 1995], [Bermond, 1972, 1973], [Charon and Hudry, 2000, 2003], [Hudry, 
1997]. The links between Slater’s solution and other tournament solutions have also been 
studied. For example, Bermond [1972] showed that the Copeland score of a Slater winner in a 
tournament with n vertices is at least n/2; this result was generalized to weighted tournaments 
in [Charon et al., 1997a] while [Guénoche, 1995] provides bounds for the rank of any vertex 
in a Slater order, still based on the Copeland scores (or on the weights of the arcs of the 
considered tournament, if this one is weighted). Bermond [1972] also exhibited a tournament 
with 7 vertices such that the set of Copeland winners and the one of Slater winners are 
disjoint. In fact, as pointed out in [Charon and Hudry, 2007a], the minimum number of 
vertices for such a situation to occur is 6. The Copeland scores may also be involved to 
provide bounds of the Slater index, as in [Charon et al., 1992a] and [Charon and Hudry, 
                                                
30 According to I. McLean, H. Lorrey and J. Colomer [2008], “Ramon Llull (ca 1232-1316) (...) made 
contributions which have been believed to be centuries more recent. Llull promotes the method of pairwise 
comparison, and proposes the Copeland rule to select a winner.” 
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2003]. More recently, Charon and Hudry [to appear] study the distance between Slater orders 
and Copeland orders (i.e., orders obtained by ranking the vertices of a tournament T according 
to the non-increasing Copeland scores of T). They show that there exist tournaments T 
admitting Slater orders OS and Copeland orders OC such that the distance θ(OS, OC) between 
these orders reaches its maximum, equal to n(n – 1)/2, in spite of Bermond’s 1972 result 
about the Copeland score of a Slater winner. 
 For more detailed surveys on Slater’s solution, see [Charon et al., 1996b], [Charon and 
Hudry, 2007, 2010] or [Laslier, 1996, 1997]. 
 
V.3. EXTENSION OF SLATER’S SOLUTION TO WEIGHTED TOURNAMENTS 
 
If T represents the majority tournament of a pairwise comparison method applied for instance 
to an election, we may weight the arcs of T. A usual way to do this consists in defining the 
weight w(x, y) of an arc (x, y) as the difference between twice the number m(x, y) of voters 
who prefer x to y minus the number m of voters when a majority of voters prefers x to y: 
w(x, y) = 2m(x, y) – m. Then, instead of considering the number of arcs that must be reversed 
in T to make it transitive, we may want to compute a minimum weighted set of arcs such that 
the simultaneous reversal of these arcs transforms T into a linear order. This allows 
representing the problem of aggregating preferences into median relations. This includes the 
so-called Kemeny’s problem31 consisting in computing a median linear order, then also called 
a Kemeny order, i.e. a linear order minimizing the total number of disagreements with respect 
to the preferences of the voters when these preferences are assumed to be linear orders. 
 More formally, consider an election in which m voters want to rank n candidates 
belonging to the set X. Let Π = (O1, O2, …, Om) denote the profile of the preferences of the m 
voters. Each preference Oj (1 ≤ j ≤ m) is assumed to be a linear order here, but more 
generally, it is a binary relation defined on X: Oj ⊆ X×X. For a binary relation O defined on X, 
let δ(Oj, O) be the symmetric difference distance between Oj and O: δ(Oj, O) = OO j! , 
where Δ denotes the symmetric difference between sets. We may interpret δ(Oj, O) as the 
number of disagreements between Oj and O. Then we define a remoteness R(Π, O) between 
Π and a binary relation O by ( )!
=
"=#
m
j
OOjOR
1
,),( . We may interpret R(Π, O) as the total 
number of disagreements between Π and O. A median relation is a relation O* minimizing R 
over a prescribed set Ω of relations fulfilling some structural properties: 
R(Π, O*) = ),(min OR
O
!
"#
. 
Here, all the preferences Oj (1 ≤ j ≤ m) are linear orders and Ω is the set of linear 
orders defined on X. Slater’s problem can also be stated in this way: in this case, Π contains 
only one preference (m = 1) which is a tournament T and Ω is still the set of linear orders 
defined on X; then, we may show that, for any linear order O, δ(T, O) is even and that we 
have the relations θ(T, O) = δ(T, O)/2 and, for any candidate x preferred to another candidate 
y according to T, we have w(x, y) = 1. In both cases, any instance of Kemeny’s problem or of 
Slater’s problem can be represented by a tournament T weighted by w(x, y) = 2m(x, y) – m, 
and the aim is then to reverse in T the orientation of arcs such that the total weight with 
                                                
31 Also called Kemeny’s rule. As this problem can be stated in different ways (see for instance [Monjardet, 
1990b] and [Charon and Hudry, 2007, 2010]), several authors rediscovered this problem under different names. 
In fact, in Kemeny’s problem, individual preferences are complete preorders and the median relation should also 
be a complete preorder. Anyway, “Kemeny’s problem” is often the expression used to call the problem 
consisting in aggregating linear orders into a median linear order, as we do here. 
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respect to w of the reversed arcs is minimum while this reversing transforms T into a linear 
order (which will be a median order). 
For the data of Example 1, the weighted tournament is the one of Figure 2. This 
tournament admits only one Kemeny order: a > b > c > d, which is also a Slater order (but this 
is not true in general). 
 
 a b 
c d 
1 
1 
3 
3 
1 
1 
 
Figure 2. The weighted tournament associated with the data of Example 1. 
 
 
V.4. MAXIMAL TRANSITIVE SUBTOURNAMENTS: BANKS’S SOLUTION 
 
Among the other tournament solutions, one was designed by J. Banks [1985]. When the 
considered tournament T is transitive (i.e. T is a linear order), there exists a unique winner (the 
Condorcet winner of the election), who is selected as the winner of T by the usual tournament 
solutions. Otherwise, we may anyway consider the transitive subtournaments of T which are 
maximal with respect to inclusion, and then select the winner of each of them as the winners 
of T. This defines the Banks’s solution: a Banks winner of T is the winner of any maximal 
(with respect to inclusion) transitive subtournament of T. 
 If we consider the majority tournament of Example 1, there exist three Banks winners: 
a (because of the maximal transitive subtournament induced by a, b and c), b (because of the 
subtournament induced by b, c and d) and d (because of the subtournament induced by d 
and a). 
 As for Slater’s solution, some papers consider the links between Banks’s solution and 
other tournament solution. For instance, Laffond and Laslier [1991] provide a tournament 
with 75 vertices such that the set of Copeland winners, the set of Slater winners and the set of 
Banks winners are pairwise disjoint. A tournament with 16 vertices such that the set of Slater 
winners and the set of Banks winners are disjoint can be found in [Charon et al., 1997b], 
while another tournament with 14 vertices satisfying the same property has been exhibited by 
Östergård and Vaskelainen [2010]. Nonetheless, the minimum number of vertices required to 
reach this property remains unknown. It is not the case for the disjunction between the set of 
Copeland winners and the one of Banks winners: it is shown in [Hudry, 1999] that the 
minimum number of vertices for this property is equal to 13. 
   
 
VI. RESTRICTED DOMAINS 
 
A set of linear orders is a Condorcet domain (called also acyclic or consistent domain) if the 
strict majority rule applied to any profile of linear orders of this set always leads to an order. 
The best known example of Condorcet domain is the single-peaked domain defined by Black 
[1948]. Its definition requires defining a reference linear order L considered as the “objective” 
order over the alternatives. It is then also called the domain of L-unimodal linear orders. 
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Guilbaud [1952] provides an analysis of the single-peaked domain showing that the set of 
single-peaked linear orders has a distributive lattice structure32 and that the majority relation 
of a profile in this domain is the median of the elements of the profile in this lattice.  
Using another paper by Guilbaud and Rosenstiehl [1963], Chameni-Nembua [1989] 
generalizes this result. Indeed, Guilbaud and Rosenstiehl show that the set L of linear orders 
can be endowed with a lattice structure called the “permutoèdre” lattice33. This lattice has an 
arbitrary linear order L as its greatest element and the dual of L as its least element. The 
unoriented covering relation of this lattice is the adjacency relation where two linear orders 
are adjacent if they differ on a unique pair of elements. The permutoèdre lattice is not 
distributive but it contains distributive sublattices. A sublattice of L is said to be covering if 
the covering relation in this sublattice is the same as the covering relation in L. Then, 
Chameni-Nembua proved that any distributive covering sublattice of the permutoèdre lattice 
L is a Condorcet domain. Indeed, in this distributive lattice, the majority relation of a profile 
of n (odd integer) linear orders is the metric (and algebraic, see Section VII) median of these n 
elements. Related results were obtained by Abello [1985, for instance] and Fishburn [1997, 
for instance]. Finally, Galambos and Reiner [2008] provide a general theorem – unifying all 
the previous results – on the Condorcet domains that are distributive covering sublattices of 
the permutoèdre lattice. A survey on all these results can be found in [Monjardet, 2009].  
 
 
VII. ABSTRACT CONSENSUS THEORIES 
 
To begin this section, we cannot do better that quoting the following excerpt of the 
introduction of Barthélemy and Janowitz’s paper [1991]: “since Arrow’s 1951 theorem, there 
has been a flurry of activity designed to prove analogues of this theorem in other contexts, and 
to establish contexts in which the rather dismaying consequences of this theorem are not 
necessarily valid. The resulting theories have developed somewhat independently in a number 
of disciplines, and one often sees the same theorem proved differently in different contexts. 
What is needed is a general mathematical model in which these matters may be disposed of in 
a common setting. That is to say, we forget about the exact nature of the objects and, using 
some abstract structure on various sets of objects under consideration, concern ourselves 
instead with ways in which the structure can be used to summarize a given family of objects”. 
Proceeding in this manner, there are two main approaches. Rubinstein and Fishburn’s 
approach [1986], following a line initiated by Wilson [1975], uses linear algebra. The other 
approach uses ordered structures and it has been followed by several researchers of the Centre 
d’analyse et de mathématique sociale. 
Recall that a meet semilattice L is a partially ordered set such that the meet (i.e. the 
greatest lower bound) x∧y of any two elements x and y of L exists (then, the meet of any finite 
subset of L exists). Dually, a join semilattice is a partially ordered set L such that the join (i.e. 
the lowest upper bound) x∨y of any two elements x and y of L exists. A lattice is a meet and 
join semilattice. Observe that many sets of binary relations are (semi)lattices for the 
operations of set intersection ∩ and set union ∪. Two lines of researches were followed. The 
                                                
32 For the definitions concerning lattices, see the following section.  
33 They considered also sublattices of this lattice as negotiation intervals between the preferences of two voters, 
an idea generalized in [Feldman-Högaasen, 1969]. 
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first one develops an axiomatic theory of consensus in (semi)lattices. The second develops the 
study of the median operation in (semi)lattices.34 
In any partially ordered set, an element is formed from simpler elements: it is the join 
(respectively, the meet) of the so-called join-irreducible (respectively, of the so-called meet-
irreducible) elements, i.e. of the elements not join of elements strictly lesser (respectively, not 
meet of elements strictly greater) than themselves35. In [Monjardet, 1990a] and [Leclerc and 
Monjardet, 1995], it is shown that the form of the consensus functions defined by the same 
axioms on a lattice strongly depends on the properties of this lattice, and in particular on a 
dependence relation δ defined on its join-irreducible elements by: 
jδj'  if  j ≠ j' and there exists x ∈ L such that j, j'    x and j < j'∨x  
They obtain the following result:  
 
THEOREM 2. 
Let L be a finite lattice and F: Ln → L a consensus function. 
(1) If L is distributive36, then F is a federation consensus function if and only if F is neutral 
monotonic. 
(2) If L is not distributive, then F is a meet projection (oligarchic) consensus function if and 
only if it is neutral. 
(3) If L is strong, then F is a meet projection (oligarchic) consensus function if and only if it 
is decisive and Paretian. 
 
The axioms involved in this theorem are straightforward generalizations of independence, 
monotonicity, neutrality and Pareto axioms used in social choice theory. A federation 
consensus function is a function defined as in Section III by a federation F on the set N of 
“voters”. Let Π = (x1, x2, …, xn) be an n-tuple of elements of L. Then  
F(Π) = ∨A∈F (∧i∈A xi). 
We may see that this formulation is the same as in Section III, the operations of set 
union and intersection being replaced by the join and meet operations of a lattice. And, by 
replacing the ordered pairs by the join-irreducible elements, we may also write, like in 
Section III: 
∀ j ∈ J, [j ∈ F(Π)] ⇔ [NΠ(j) ∈ F], 
where NΠ(j) = {i ∈ N: j ∈ xi}.  
In case (1) of Theorem 2, the lattice is distributive, which is equivalent to say that its 
dependence relation reduces to the order relation existing between its join-irreducible 
elements37. Then, there are as many neutral, monotonic consensus functions as there are 
federations (simple games) on N. But as soon as the lattice L is no longer distributive, the 
same axioms reduce the class of admissible functions strongly: there exists a (nonempty) 
                                                
34 [Barthélemy, Leclerc and Monjardet, 1986] provides a survey up to 1986 on these two research lines and their 
applications to the comparison and to the consensus of classifications.  
35 For instance, in the lattice of all binary relations, the join-irreducible elements are the relations containing a 
unique ordered pair (x, y) and, in the meet semilattice of orders, the meet-irreducible elements are the linear 
orders.  
36 A lattice L is distributive if each one of the meet and join operations is distributive over the other, for instance 
if, for all (x, y, z) ∈ L3, x∧(y∨z) = (x∧y)∨(x∧z) (this distributivity of the meet operation over the join operation 
implies the distributivity of the join operation over the meet operation, and conversely).  
37 For any partially ordered set P, there exists a distributive lattice such that the poset of its join-irreducible 
elements is isomorphic to P.  
/ !
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subset A of N such that F(Π) = ∧i∈A xi (which means that the only admissible federations are 
those formed by the supersets of a nonempty subset of N). Finally, when L is strong, i.e. when 
the dependence relation is strongly connected, the decisivity and Paretian axioms imply the 
stronger axiom of neutral monotonicity. The above result is in fact a particular case of a more 
general result obtained for semilattices.  
Since first Barbut’s works [1961, 1969], the abstract latticial approach has also been 
developed much for metric consensus. In this case, we have a meet (or a join) semilattice L 
endowed with a distance d. Several distances are possible and the most usual, used below, 
generalizes the symmetric difference distance. Axiomatic characterizations of these distances 
can be found in [Barthélemy, 1979], [Monjardet, 1981] and [Barthélemy, Leclerc and 
Monjardet, 1986].  
Let Π = (x1, x2, …, xn) be an n-tuple of elements of L. The remoteness of an element x 
of L from Π (with respect to the distance d) is  
R(Π, x) = ∑i∈N d(x, xi). 
A median of Π (with respect to the distance d) is any element of L minimizing this 
remoteness; it is called a Π-median. The set of Π-medians is denoted by MedLΠ. Observe 
that, since there generally exist several medians, the median rule is a map from Ln to 2L, so 
defining a multi-consensus rule.  
On the other hand, several “majority” elements can be associated with Π, obtained by 
using different forms of the majority rule. Let J (respectively, J′) be the set of join-irreducible 
(respectively, meet-irreducible) elements of L. We set: 
C(Π) = {j ∈ J: |{i ∈ N: j ≤ xi}| > n/2}, C′(Π) = {j′ ∈ J′: |{i ∈ N: j′ ≥ xi}| > n/2}, 
B(Π) = {j ∈ J: |{i ∈ N: j ≤ xi}| ≥ n/2}, B′(Π) = {j′ ∈ J′: |{i ∈ N: j′ ≥ xi}| ≥ n/2} 
and 
c(Π) = ∨C(Π) ; c′(Π) = ∧C′(Π) ; b(Π) = ∨B(Π) ; b′(Π) = ∧B′(Π). 
In a semilattice, some of these elements may not exist. For the existing elements, we 
have c(Π) ≤ b(Π) ≤ c′(Π) and c(Π) ≤ b′(Π) ≤ c′(Π). If n is odd, we have c(Π) = b(Π) and 
b′(Π) = c′(Π). If L is a distributive lattice, we have c(Π) = b′(Π) and c′(Π) = b(Π). 
The reason to consider these majority elements will become clear below. We consider 
as the distance a straightforward generalization of the symmetric difference distance 
previously used in Section IV. This generalization uses the join-irreducible representation of 
the elements mentioned above. Let x be an element of a semilattice L; set Jx = {j ∈ J: j ≤ x} 
(thus, x = ∨Jx). Now write, for any (x, x′) belonging to L2: 
δ(x, x′) = |Jx∆ Jx′ | = |Jx∪ Jx′ | – |Jx∩ Jx′ | = |{j ∈ J: [j ∈ Jx and j ∉ Jx′ ] or [j ∉ Jx and j ∈ Jx′ ]}|. 
A meet semilattice L is said to be lower distributive if, for any x ∈ L, the lattice 
{x′ ∈ L: x′ ≤ x} is distributive (see footnote 36). A median semilattice [Avann, 1961] is a 
lower distributive meet semilattice L in which, for all (x1, x2, x3) ∈ L3, x1∨x2∨x3 exists as soon 
as the three elements x1∨x2, x1∨x3 and x2∨x3 all exist. In such a median semilattice, the element 
(x∧x′ )∨(x′∧x″ )∨(x″∧x) exists for any (x, x′, x″) ∈ L3 and is called the (algebraic) median of 
these three elements. Then, it can be shown that, for Π = (x1, x2, …, xn), the (algebraic) 
median of Π, i.e. the element c(Π), also exists (but not necessarily the element b(Π)). If a 
median semilattice is a lattice, it is a distributive lattice. When L is a median semilattice, the 
medians of a profile with respect to the metric δ can be easily obtained from the majority 
elements, as shown in the result below. This characterization of medians with respect to δ in a 
median semilattice [Bandelt and Barthélemy,1984] generalizes a series of results on medians 
in distributive lattices [Birkhoff and Kiss, 1947], [Barbut, 1961], [Monjardet, 1980]: 
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THEOREM 3. 
Let L be a median semilattice and Π ∈ Ln be a profile of L. If n is odd, then c(Π) is the unique 
Π-median; if n is even, then the set of all Π-medians with respect to the symmetric difference 
distance metric δ is MedL(Π) = {∨K: C(Π) ⊆ K ⊆ B(Π) and ∨K exists}. 
 
In particular, in a distributive lattice, the set of all Π-medians is the median interval 
[c(Π), b(Π)] = {x ∈ L: c(Π) ≤ x ≤ b(Π)} [Monjardet, 1980]. If n is odd, c(Π) = b(Π) is the 
unique median. The fact that these properties characterize distributive lattices can be obtained 
from the following more general result due to Leclerc [1990], where the distance used is the 
distance dsp of the shortest path38:  
 
THEOREM 4. 
A lattice is upper semimodular39 if and only if, for any profile Π and for any Π-median m 
(with respect to the distance dsp), the inequality c(Π) ≤ m holds. 
 
Observe that this result gives a lower bound for medians (with respect to dsp) in the 
case of an upper semimodular lattice. This is significant since, except for the median 
semilattice case, medians may be difficult to compute. Continuing this line of research, 
Leclerc gave many results on medians with respect to other metrics and other semilattices. A 
usual way to define metrics on semilattices (and more generally on partially ordered sets) is to 
use valuations. Let v be a strictly isotone (i.e. x < y implies v(x) < v(y)) real map on a meet 
semilattice L. The map v is a lower valuation if it satisfies the following property whenever x∨y 
exists: 
v(x) + v(y) ≤ v(x∧y) + v(x∨y). 
For all (x, y) ∈ L2, set dv(x, y) = v(x) + v(y) – 2v(x∧y). 
A classic result40 says that a strictly isotone real function v on a meet semilattice L is a 
lower valuation if and only if dv is a distance on L. The following characterization of lower valuations [Leclerc, 1993] provides an upper bound to medians:  
 
THEOREM 5. 
A strictly isotone real function v on a meet semilattice L is a lower valuation if and only if, for 
any profile Π such that C′(Π) is not empty and for any Π-median m with respect to the metric 
dv, the inequality m ≤ c′(Π) holds. 
 
Obviously, there exist dual results for join semilattices and upper valuations 
(v(x) + v(y) ≥ v(x∧y) + v(x∨y)) and the application of these results to lattices gives, for 
instance, the following result:  
 
THEOREM 6. 
A strictly isotone real function v on a finite lattice L is a valuation41 if and only if, for any profile 
Π and for any Π-median m with respect to the metric dv, the inequalities c(Π) ≤ m ≤ c′(Π) 
hold. 
                                                
38 Let p be the covering relation of L: x p y whenever x ≤ z < y implies x = z. Setting xEy if x p y or y p x defines 
an undirected graph (L, E). The distance dsp between x and y is the minimum length of a path between x and y in 
this graph. 
39 A lattice L is upper (respectively, lower) semimodular if, for all (x, y, z) ∈ L3, x∧y p x and x∧y p y imply 
(respectively, are implied by) x p x∨y and y p x∨y where p denotes the covering relation of L. A lattice is 
modular if it is upper and lower semimodular. A distributive lattice is modular (but the converse is false).  
40 See [Monjardet, 1981] for a survey on such results.  
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We consider now the case of particular lower valuations called weight valuations. A real 
function v on a meet semilattice L is said to be a weight valuation if there exists a strictly positive 
real map w defined on the set J of its join-irreducible elements such that, for any x ∈ L, 
 v(x) = Σj∈J(x) w(j). 
It is easy to see that a weight valuation v on a meet semilattice is a lower valuation. The 
associated weight metric dv is given, for all (x, y) ∈ L2, by  
dv(x, y) = Σj∈J(x)ΔJ(y) w(j). 
In particular, setting w(j) uniformly equal to 1, we get the lower valuation v(x) = |J(x)|, and the 
corresponding metric dv is nothing else than the metric δ of the symmetric difference defined 
above. The following result [Leclerc, 1994] provides upper bounds and intervals for medians.  
 
THEOREM 7. 
Let L be a finite meet semilattice endowed with a weight metric dv. 
For any profile Π such that b(Π) exists and for any median m of Π, the inequality m ≤ b(Π) 
holds. 
For any profile Π such that c(Π) exists and for any median m of Π, there exists a median m0 of 
Π such that: 
(i) m0 ≤ c(Π); 
(ii) m0 ≤ m; (iii) all the elements of the lattice interval [m0, m] are medians.  
We consider now the case where the meet semilattice L is lower distributive (recall 
that it means that, for any x ∈ L, the set (x] = {y with y ≤ x} is a distributive lattice). In this 
case, Leclerc [1994] first shows that a weight valuation v on L is characterized by the fact that 
it is strictly isotone and that, for all (x, y) ∈ L2 such that x∨y exists, we have 
v(x∧y) + v(x∨y) = v(x) + v(y). Then, he extends the previous result on medians (with respect to 
the distance δ) in median semilattices to this case:  
 
THEOREM 8. 
Let L be a finite lower distributive semilattice and Π ∈ Ln be a profile such that c(Π) exists, 
and let v be a weight valuation on L. Then, if n is an odd number, c(Π) is the unique median. 
If n is even, the set of all the Π-medians with respect to the metric dv is 
Meddv(Π) = {∨K: C(Π) ⊆ K ⊆ B(Π) and ∨K exists}. 
 
Observe that, in a lower distributive semilattice and contrary to a median semilattice, 
the element c(Π) may not exist. Nevertheless, it is possible to give a way to search medians in 
this case.  
Obviously, all the previous results can be applied to “concrete” objects. It suffices that 
the set of all the considered objects can be endowed with a (semi)latticial structure. It is the 
case for many sets of relations (like orders or equivalences), for many sets of classifications 
(like partitions or hierarchies), for many sets of maps (like fuzzy preorders, choice functions 
or ultrametrics). Then, to apply the previous results, it suffices to determine the latticial 
properties of these ordered sets. In some cases, one can also obtain specific results. The 
example below illustrates such a situation.  
                                                                                                                                                              
41 A strictly isotone real function v on a lattice L is a valuation if it satisfies v(x∧y) + v(x∨y) = v(x) + v(y). The 
existence of such a valuation characterizes the modular lattices.  
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Let O be the set of all the orders defined on a set X endowed with the inclusion 
relation. The partially ordered set O is a lower locally distributive meet semilattice42 [Leclerc, 
2003]. Using the above results on medians with respect to a weight metric, we can for 
instance obtain that the covering relation of any median order of a profile of orders is formed 
of majority ordered pairs (a generalization of a result on median linear orders can be found in 
[Monjardet, 1973]). On the other hand, a classic and desirable property for a consensus rule is 
the Pareto property, requiring that the consensus order keeps the unanimous preferences. In 
the latticial context, this property translates into the following form. A consensus rule on a 
semilattice L has the Pareto property if for any profile Π = (x1, x2, …, xn) ∈ Ln and for any 
consensus element m, ∧i∈N xi ≤ m holds. In [Leclerc, 2003], it is shown that the median rule 
for orders with respect to the symmetric difference distance δ satisfies the Pareto property but 
that this property is not satisfied with respect to other weight metrics. The same is true for 
partitions [Barthélemy and Leclerc, 1995]. Still in [Leclerc, 2003], many similar results may 
be found concerning the Pareto property for various metrics and various semilattices. Observe 
for instance that Leclerc’s characterization of upper semimodular lattice given above (by the 
inequality c(Π) ≤ m for any Π-median m, with respect to the distance δ) shows that in this 
case the median rule has the Pareto property (a result first obtained by Barthélemy [1981]). 
Barthélemy [1976] proves Paretian properties for metric procedures defined on large classes 
of binary relations by remoteness functions satisfying monotonicity properties.  
Coming back to the axiomatic approach, we can search to provide an axiomatic 
characterization of median rules. As already said, the first such result was obtained by Young 
and Levenglick [1978] for the case of the median rule (with respect to the symmetric 
difference distance δ) for linear orders. Barthélemy and Janowitz [1991] characterized the 
median rule (with respect to δ) on median semilattices by the consistency property (see 
footnote 29) and four other properties. Their result was improved by McMorris, Mulder and 
Powers [2000] who use only the consistency property and two other properties. 
Another abstract approach to the aggregation problem was initiated by Guilbaud 
[1952] as early as 1952. Indeed, in his paper “Les théories de l’intérêt général et le problème 
logique de l’agrégation”, Guilbaud considers the aggregation of individual opinions (or 
judgments) consisting of the answers “yes” or “no” to a series of questions. In other terms, the 
opinion of an individual (for instance, a judge) is the set of valuations 0 or 1 given to a set of 
binary propositions. When these propositions are logically connected, it is assumed that these 
valuations respect the connexions. For instance, if proposition p implies proposition q, then an 
answer “yes” to p implies an answer “yes” to q. So, Guilbaud searches independent and 
neutral aggregation rules such that the collective judgment always respects the same 
connexions as the individual judgments. And the answer is that they are only the dictatorships 
for which the collective judgment is the judgment of one individual. A reconstruction of 
Guilbaud’s proof and historical considerations on his paper can be found in Eckert and 
Monjardet (2010). One can observe that in this paper Guilbaud appears as a precursor of the 
so-called judgment aggregation considerably developed in the last years. In the present 
formulation of judgment aggregation, an individual judgment is the set of accepted 
propositions in an agenda of logically interconnected propositions43.  
 
                                                
42 A lower locally distributive meet semilattice is a meet semilattice such that all its principal ideals (x] are lower 
locally distributive lattices. A lower locally distributive lattice can be defined for instance by the fact that for any 
x ∈ L, the interval [∧{y ∈ L: y p x}, x] is a Boolean lattice.  
43 For instance, in standard propositional logic, propositions have two truth values and it is assumed that an 
individual judgment satisfies coherence conditions like consistency or/and completeness.  
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VIII. ALGORITHMIC AND COMPLEXITY ISSUES 
 
As said in the introduction, the algorithmic complexity of a method plays an important role. It 
is usual to distinguish between polynomial problems and NP-hard ones. Let us remind that a 
problem is polynomial when there exists a polynomial method to solve it. On the opposite, the 
practical consequence of the NP-hardness of a problem is that none polynomial method is 
known to solve it exactly; so, solving such a problem exactly may require a CPU time which 
may increase exponentially with the size of the instances to solve (for more details upon the 
theory of algorithmic complexity and the theory of NP-completeness, see for instance 
[Barthélemy, Cohen and Lobstein, 1996] or [Garey and Johnson, 1979]). 
The computation of median linear orders is a problem which can be modelled as a 
particular case of the linear ordering problem44 and so as a 0-1 linear program (see, for 
instance [Reinelt, 1985] or [Charon and Hudry, 2010]). It has been shown to be NP-hard (see 
below). This fact induces that exact methods giving the median orders do not allow solving 
large (with respect to the number of alternatives) problems45. These methods are mainly based 
on branch and bound methods. For instance, Bermond and Kodratoff [1976], then 
Barthélemy, Guénoche and Hudry [1989] provide branch and bound algorithms later 
improved with the help of some theoretical results in [Charon et al., 1992b, 1996a, 1997a, 
2006a]. When these methods cannot be applied, another possibility is to look for approximate 
solutions, with the hope to compute “good” solutions in a “reasonable” time. Some of these 
heuristics are specific to the considered problem (see [Charon and Hudry, 2010] for a survey). 
Other methods come from metaheuristics (general approximate methods) such as simulated 
annealing, tabu search, noising methods, genetic algorithms or even some hybridization 
between these different methods (once again, see [Charon and Hudry, 2010] for a survey). 
They have been used for instance in [Hudry, 1989], [Charon and Hudry, 1998, 2009]. If the 
quality of some specific heuristics may decrease quite fast with the size of the considered 
instance, metaheuristics seem to provide good results in a limited amount of computation 
time.  
The computation of a median partition is also a NP-hard problem [Barthélemy and 
Leclerc, 1995]46. This problem can be modelled as an instance of another NP-hard problem 
known as the clique partitioning problem. Here also, metaheuristics can be applied to 
compute medians partitions. For instance, de Amorim, Barthélemy and Ribeiro [1992] apply 
simulated annealing and Tabu search to this problem. Charon and Hudry [1993, 2006b, 
2007b, 2009] provide a metaheuristic based on their noising method (a metaheuristic which 
generalizes simulated annealing and threshold accepting methods, see [Charon and Hudry, 
2001, 2002]). For other approaches, see the survey [Barthélemy and Leclerc, 1995].  
 The complexities of the tournament solutions depicted in Section V are summarized in 
the following theorems (see [Hudry, 2009b] for more details and for complexity results about 
                                                
44 This problem includes also a representation of Slater’s problem. This one consists in searching a linear order 
fitting a tournament at best. And indeed the search of a median order can be stated as the search of a linear order 
fitting a weighted tournament at best (see Section V). 
45 It is difficult to give a specific value, since the performances of the algorithms much depend on the considered 
instances and on the used computer. For example, the software available at the Web address 
http://www.enst.fr/~charon/tournament/median.html can deal with instances simulating some real data with 100 
candidates in about 1 second. Random instances seem more difficult to solve (see [Charon and Hudry, 2006a]).  
46 More precisely, the problem is NP-hard when the number of partitions to aggregate is not fixed, and its status 
is not known for a fixed value of this number. 
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other tournament solutions; a more general survey on the complexity of voting procedures can 
be found in [Hudry 2009a]).  
 
THEOREM 9. 
Let T be a tournament with n vertices. 
• Computing the Copeland winners of T can be done in O(n2). 
• Computing a Banks winner can be done in O(n2) [Hudry, 2004]. 
 
THEOREM 10. 
The following problems are NP-complete: 
• Given a tournament T and a vertex x of T, is x a Banks winner of T? [Woeginger, 
2003]. 
• Given a tournament T and an integer k, is the Slater index i(T) of T less than or equal 
to k? (see [Hudry, 2010], based on the results obtained independently by 
[Alon, 2006], [Charbit, Thomasse and Yeo, 2007] and [Conitzer, 2006]). 
  
THEOREM 11. 
The following problems are NP-hard: 
• Given a tournament T, compute all the Banks winners of T. 
• Given a tournament T, compute the Slater index i(T) of T. 
• Given a tournament T, compute a Slater winner of T. 
• Given a tournament T, compute all the Slater winners of T. 
• Given a tournament T and a vertex x of T, is x a Slater winner of T? 
• Given a tournament T, compute a Slater order of T. 
• Given a tournament T, compute all the Slater orders of T. 
 
THEOREM 12. 
The following problem belongs to co-NP: 
• Given a tournament T = (X, A) and a linear order O defined on X, is O a Slater order 
of T? 
 
We may note that it is possible to compute a Banks winner in polynomial time while 
checking that a given vertex is a Banks winner is NP-hard; there is no contradiction, because 
we do not choose the Banks winner that we may compute in polynomial time (see [Guénoche, 
1996] for an – exponential – algorithm computing all the Banks winners of a tournament). 
Note also that the decision problem of Theorem 11 is not known to belong to NP, and that the 
problem of Theorem 12 is conjectured to be co-NP-complete in [Hudry, 2010]. 
 To finish this section, we consider the aggregation of linear orders into median 
relations. The case of a median relation which must be a linear order is the most studied (see 
[Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick, 1989], [Dwork et al., 2001], [Hemaspaandra et al., 2005], 
[Hudry, 1989 and 2008]; see [Charon and Hudry, 2010] for more general references on the 
properties of median linear orders).  
 
THEOREM 13. 
The following problems are NP-hard:  
• Let m be an even integer greater than or equal to 4; given a profile Π of m linear 
orders, compute a median linear order of Π. 
• Given a profile Π of m linear orders defined on a set X with n elements with m odd 
and m large enough (at least about n2), compute a median linear order of Π. 
The aggregation of two linear orders into a median linear order is a polynomial problem.  
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In other words, the aggregation of m linear orders into a median linear order is NP-
hard when the number m of voters is large enough. More precisely, it is NP-hard for any fixed 
even value of m with m ≥ 4, but the minimum odd value of m such that this problem is NP-
hard is not known. 
Theorem 13 can be generalized into two directions. On the one hand, the same results 
apply if we consider a profile of any kind of preferences containing linear orders as special 
cases (for instance, profiles of orders, or of preorders, or of binary relations, and so on). On 
the other hand, the variants for which we look for a median relation which would not be 
necessarily a linear order but another kind of median partially ordered relation often remain 
also NP-hard when m is large enough (see also [Wakabayashi, 1986 and 1998] where the 
aggregation of binary relations into different types of median relations is studied): 
 
THEOREM 14. 
The aggregation of m linear orders into a median relation is an NP-hard problem [Hudry, 
1989, 2008, submitted] when:  
• the median relation must be an acyclic relation47, a complete preorder (see footnote 8) 
or a weak order48 and m is any fixed even value with m ≥ 4 or m takes an odd value 
large enough (at least about n2); 
• the median relation must be an interval order49, a semiorder50 or a quasi-order51 and 
m takes a value large enough (at least about n2 for even values of m, or at least about 
n4 for odd values of m). 
 
Note that, when not trivial, the complexity of the above problems is not known for 
values of m less than the ones stated in Theorem 14. Note also that the complexity of the 
aggregation of linear orders into a median order or a median preorder remains unknown. 
On the other hand, the next theorem can be obtained as a corollary of Section VI: 
 
THEOREM 15. 
                                                
47 An acyclic relation is a relation without directed cycle. 
48 Here, a weak order is defined as the asymmetric part of any complete preorder. 
49 An interval order is an order R satisfying the property: ∀ (x, y, z, t) ∈ X4 with x, y, z and t pairwise distinct, 
(xRy and zRt) ⇒ (xRt or zRy). The name “interval order” comes from the fact that such an order may be 
described by intervals defined on the set of real numbers and spread over the real axis. The relation xRy then 
means that the interval associated with x is utterly on the left of the interval associated with y; if the two intervals 
overlap, then x and y are incomparable. The implication (xRy and zRt) ⇒ (xRt or zRy) means that, if the interval 
associated with x (respectively z) is completely on the left of the interval associated with y (respectively t), the 
interval associated with x must be on the left of the interval associated with t or the interval associated with z 
must be on the left of the interval associated with y. Note that the lengths of the intervals are not necessarily the 
same for all the intervals. 
50 A semiorder is an interval order R satisfying the property: ∀ (x, y, z, t) ∈ X4 with x, y, z and t pairwise distinct, 
(xRy and yRz) ⇒ (xRt or tRz). As an interval order, a semiorder may be represented by intervals. In this case, all 
the intervals have the same length. Then the implication (xRy and yRz) ⇒ (xRt or (inclusively) tRz) means that, if 
the interval associated with x (respectively y) is completely on the left of the interval associated with y 
(respectively z), then the interval associated with any extra t cannot overlap the interval associated with x and the 
one associated with z simultaneously: the length of the interval associated with t is too small for that. For more 
details, see [Aleskerov, Bouyssou and Monjardet, 2007]. 
51 A quasi-order is here defined as the asymmetric part of any semiorder (we must observe that in the literature 
this asymmetric part can be also called semiorder). 
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The aggregation of single-peaked linear orders into a median relation is a polynomial 
problem when the median relation must be a linear order. 
Indeed in this case majority rule provides median linear orders. 
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